Abstract. We discuss generic formal requirements for reasoning about two party k ey distribution protocols, using a language developed for specifying security requirements for security protocols. Typically earlier work has considered formal analysis of already developed protocols. Our goal is to present sets of formal requirements for various contexts which can be applied at the design stage as well as to existing protocols. We use a protocol analysis tool we h a v e developed to determine whether or not a speci c protocol has met some of the requirements we speci ed. We show h o w this process uncovered a aw in the protocol and helped us re ne our requirements.
Introduction
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the development and use of formal methods to analyze security properties of cryptographic protocols. Together with this increased interest, there has been a growing recognition that it is not enough to possess a means of formally specifying and analyzing a protocol; one must also have a means of formally specifying the properties that a protocol must have. One way of gaining greater assurance that one is specifying and verifying the correct properties is to develop a formal requirements language that one can use to de ne the properties one wants to hold for the protocol. Although the use of a formal requirements language will not guarantee by itself that one has thought of all necessary protocol requirements, it will at least assist in understanding and using the requirements.
In an earlier paper, 10 , we set forth such a requirements language that was intended for use with the NRL Protocol Analyzer, an automated tool for specifying and analyzing cryptographic protocols. The Protocol Analyzer veri es that a protocol meets a set of requirements by c hecking that every possible run of the protocol is one over which the requirements remain valid unless of course this is not so, in which case the Analyzer shows that instead. In other words, the Protocol Analyzer functions as a semantic model checker with respect to the requirements language. In that paper, we l o o k ed at a simple one-sided pure authentication protocol to show h o w one could use the requirements language to specify a number of di erent requirements. And we showed how w e could use the Protocol Analyzer to prove that the protocol met the requirements set forth in the language.
In this paper we provide further evidence of the usefulness of our language by using it to specify more realistic protocols. In particular, we use the language to de ne requirements for two-party k ey distribution protocols with one or more servers. These are the types of protocols that have received the most interest in the veri cation literature; so, it is useful to have a set of requirements for comparison.
The Language
Our language contains a denumerable collection of constant singular terms, typically represented by letters from the beginning of the alphabet. We also have a denumerable collection of variable terms, typically represented by letters from the end of the alphabet. We also have, for each n 1, n-ary function letters taking terms of either type as arguments and allowing us to build up functional terms in the usual recursive fashion. We will always indicate whether a term is constant o r v ariable if there is any potential for confusion. We h a v e a denumerable collection of n-ary action symbols for each arity n 1. These will be written as words in typewriter script e.g., accept. The rst argument o f an action symbol is reserved for a term representing the agent of the action in question. An atomic formula consists of an n-ary action symbol, e.g.,`act' followed by a n n -tuple of terms. We h a v e the usual logical connectives: :,^, _, !, and $, and also one temporal operator: 3 -. Complex formulae are built up from atomic formulae in the usual recursive fashion. Note that this is only a formal language, not a logic; hence there are no axioms or inference rules.
In general, an action symbol will be of the following form. It will have four arguments, the rst representing the agent of the action in question, the second representing the other principals involved in the action, the third representing the words involved in the action, and the fourth representing the local round number of the agent of the action, where a round number local to a principal identi es all actions pertaining to a single session as far as that principal is concerned. Action symbols can describe such e v ents as a principal sending a message, the learning of a word by the intruder, or a principal's making a change to one or more of its local state variables. An action symbol may map to more than one event, and for a given event, there may be more than one action symbol mapping to it. Requirements are stated in terms of conditions on traces of action symbols. For example, we m a y require that an event indicated by an action symbol can only take place if some event indicated by another action symbol has taken place previously.
The NRL Protocol Analyzer
In this section we give a brief overview of the NRL Protocol Analyzer. More complete descriptions may be found in 7, 6 .
The NRL Protocol Analyzer is a software tool that can be used either to prove theorems about security properties of cryptographic protocols, or to nd aws if the theorems turn out not to be true. The model used by the Protocol Analyzer is an extension of the Dolev-Yao model 4 . We assume that the participants in the protocol are communicating in a network under the control of a hostile intruder who may also have access to the network as a legitimate user or users. The intruder has the ability to read all message tra c, destroy and alter messages, and create his own messages. Since all messages pass through the intruder's domain, any message that an honest participant sees can be assumed to originate from the intruder. Thus a protocol rule describes, not how one participant sends a message in response to another, but how the intruder manipulates the system to produce messages by causing principals to receive certain other messages.
As in Dolev-Yao, the words generated in the protocol obey a set of reduction rules that is, rules for reducing words to simpler words, so we can think of the protocol as a machine by which the intruder produces words in the termrewriting system. Also, as in Dolev-Yao, we make v ery strong assumptions about the knowledge gained when an intruder observes a message. We assume that the intruder learns the complete signi cance of each message at the moment that it is observed. Thus, if the intruder sees a string of bits that is the result of encrypting a message from A to B with a session key belonging to A and B, he knows that is what it is, although he will not know either the message or the key if he has not observed them.
A speci cation in the Protocol Analyzer describes how one moves from one state to another via honest participants sending data, honest participants receiving data, honest participants manipulating stored data, and the intruder's manipulation of data sent b y the honest participants. Honest principals keep track of where they are in the protocol by means of local state variables. A state in the Protocol Analyzer is described by some combination of words known by the intruder, values of local state variables, and sequences of events that have occurred some time in the past. One uses the NRL Protocol Analyzer by specifying an insecure state and attempting to prove it unreachable. This is done by reducing the state space to a manageable size by proving a set of inductive lemmas about the unreachability of in nite classes of states and then performing an exhaustive search on the remaining state space. If the state is unreachable, every path to the state should begin in a state that was proved unreachable. If a state is reachable, the Analyzer should generate a path to the state. One can use the Protocol Analyzer to prove that requirements stated in the requirements language are satis ed by mapping action terms to Protocol Analyzer events. One then replaces each requirement b y its negation and attempts to prove that the state speci ed by the negation is not reachable. 4 Two party, one server key distribution protocols
Requirements for one time authentication protocols
We begin with the requirements for a key distribution protocol with a single key server. We restrict outselves to the case in which there are two parties involved in obtaining keys, one who initiates the protocol, who we designate as the initiator, and the other, who we designate as the receiver. The server can be either a separate entity, or the initiator or receiver. For this set of requirements, we assume that the server given that he is distinct from the two principals is honest. Individuals attempting to communicate may be either honest or dishonest. However, we only consider requirements for communication between two honest principals together with an honest server. This is because, under our assumptions, if any party is dishonest, they will share the key with the intruder, and so the fundamental requirement o f k ey secrecy will not be satis ed. 1 There are some obvious requirements on such a protocol. First of all, if a key is accepted by an honest principal for communication with another honest principal, it should not be learned by the intruder, either before or after the accept event, unless as a result of some key compromise that is outside the scope of the protocol. Secondly, replays of old keys should be avoided. Thus, if a key is accepted for communication b y honest principal A with honest principal B, i t should not have been accepted in the past, except possibly by B for communication with A. Thirdly, i f a k ey has been accepted for communication between A and B, then it should have been generated by a server for use between A and B. Finally, w e make the more subtle requirement that, if A or B accept a key for conversation with the other and with A as an initiator, then A did in fact initiate the conversation. Thus, A and B cannot be tricked into having a conversation that neither one of them initiated.
We begin by describing the various event statements that are involved in informal requirements that we h a v e stated so far. They are as follows.
Initiator A requests to talk to receiver B: requestuserA; honest; userB;Y;; M Server S sends a key K for communication between A and B:
sendS; userA; X; userB;Y; K ; M Initiator A accepts a key for conversation with receiver B: init acceptuserA; honest; userB;Y; K ; M Receiver B accepts a key for conversation with initiator A: rec acceptuserB;honest ; userA; X; K ; M P enetrator P learns a key: learnP;; K ; M Key is compromised: compromiseenvironment; ; K ; M We can now set forth the requirements 2 : 1. If a key has been accepted, it should not be learned by the intruder, except through a compromise event:
init acceptuserA; honest; userB;honest; K ; M 1 ! : 3 -init acceptuserC;honest ; userD;X; K ; M ? 3 -rec acceptuserC;honest; userD;X; K ; M ? ! C = B^D = A 3. If a key is accepted for communication between two e n tities, then it must have been requested by the initiating entity and sent b y a server for communication between those two e n tities. Again, this becomes two requirements, one for the initiator and one for the receiver. 
Requirements for repeated authentication
Recent l y a n umber of protocols have been proposed that explicitly include reauthentication of principals to use a previously distributed session key. 5 , 8 , 12 When session keys can safely be used for more than the length of a single session these protocols provide reauthentication with fewer messages than the number required for initial distribution and require fewer session keys to be generated by allowing reuse. This cuts down on expense in communication and computation. More importantly, a server is only required for the initial exchange; none is necessary for reauthentication. Since these protocols may be less familiar than those addressed in the last section, we give an example of one, taken from 12 . This example will also be used later to demonstrate speci c protocol analysis. It is typical of such protocols in that it produces a ticket in the initial exchange to be used during subsequent authentication. It is derived from the protocols KSL and NS, presented in 5 and 8 respectively. The initial exchange is straightforward: it is similar to single round key distribution protocols, and we mostly use standard notation here. A and B are the two principals, and S is the server. N x is a nonce generated by X and used by X to determine freshness. K xy is a key to be used exclusively for communication between X and Y and assumed to be known only to them or those they trust.`fMessageg K ' represents a message encrypted with K, where Message is the corresponding cleartext.`T x ' usually indicates a timestamp generated by X. Here we use T b to determine the expiration time of the ticket, fA; K ab ; T b g K bb , and associated session key, K ab . This ticket can be used for subsequent authentication. Following Kehne et al., we use`K bb ' to represent a k ey used exclusively to produce a ticket to be checked only by B. Not following Kehne et al., the ticket key is assumed to be known to the server as well as to B. H o w ever, the server is expected to use it only for this purpose. And, B is expected to be able to detect the error should he receive either a putative ticket encrypted with K bs or a non-ticket encrypted with K bb . W e n o w give the subsequent authentication part of the protocol. If the key is still good he generates his own new nonce, which he sends to A. He also sends her back the nonce she generated encrypted with the session key. Since this key is used only by A and B and since she knows the nonce is fresh, upon her receiving this, B will be authenticated to A. Finally, A encrypts B's nonce with the session key and sends it back to him, thus authenticating A to B. W e will return to look at this protocol in more detail below.
Modi ed
The requirements set out above are for protocols where the distributed key is only to be used for one session. While these requirements may be generically adequate for the initial exchange of a protocol allowing repeated authentication, further requirements are necessary for the subsequent authentication subprotocol. Also necessary is a small but signi cant c hange to handle the subtleties introduced to our notion of currency by such protocols. Until recently the primary approach to currency, i.e. connection to a particular protocol round, has been via authentication and freshness. One showed that a message was both recent and originated by the correct principal in order to show currency to a given round. 3 Recently, a n umber of papers have shown how t o i n terleave messages from simultaneous rounds to produce attacks. Cf., e.g., 1 , 3 , 9 , 11 . Against such i n terleaving attacks freshness is no guarantee of currency.
The matter only becomes more complex for repeat authentication protocols. These protocols need to be concerned simultaneously with currency within a round and currency to a class of rounds: we m ust make sure that the messages involved in the reauthentication are current and that the session key involved is also current. These are two di erent judgements of currency. F or, if currency is bounded only by connection to the initial exchange, then there is no need for reauthentication. And, if currency is relative only to the reauthentication, then the session key is no longer current.
Within a single protocol round, we m ust be concerned with freedom from interleaving attacks whether it is the initial exchange or reauthentication that is executed. However, across multiple reauthentications of a given protocol such concern may o r m a y not be important. For, if two principals were to have more than one ticket currently acceptable for potential reauthentication, there may b e no problem in a random choice of either one to begin a round. In this case, there can be no question of interleaving because there is no notion of a single round across repeated authentications. On the other hand, if we w anted to reserve s p eci c multisession keys for particular types of communication between principals, then we could conceivably have i n terleaving attacks: a principal could be tricked into using a key for one class of communication that was meant for another. We make some small adjustments to the structure of event statements in order to allow enough exibility to express the types of requirements germane to these issues.
The event statements have the usual format of an action symbol with four arguments. The fourth argument, for round numbers, now is of the form N:M. The M indicates the local round number as before. The N indicates an extended local round number, which m a y o r m a y not be required to stay the same across repeated authentications. In order to address currency of the session key, the third argument i s n o w an ordered pair, e.g., K;T. This gives both a key and an expiration time. Note that in the following event statements metalinguistic use of`initiator' refers to the initiator of subsequent authentication, who need not be the initiator of the initial exchange. Similarly for`receiver'. In addition to the previous event statements, appropriately reformatted, we h a v e the following.
Reauthentication initiator A requests a subsequent session with receiver B:
rerequestuserA; honest; userB;Y;; N : M Reauthentication initiator A accepts a key for a subsequent conversation with receiver B: init reacceptuserA; honest; userB;Y;K;T; N : M Reauthentication receiver B accepts a key for subsequent conversation with initiator A: rec reacceptuserB;honest ; userA; X; K;T; N : M Session key is assessed to have timed-out by principal A:
timeoutuserA; honest; userX;Y;K;T; N : M It might seem that in order for a principal to accept a key for a subsequent session we should require that it was properly requested for initial exchange, sent b y the server, etc. Much of this can be accomplished, however, simply by requiring that for a principal to reaccept a key he should have accepted it in a previous session. This will in turn force all the requirements that such acceptance implies. We can thus focus exclusively on the requirements for the reacceptance of the key.
The requirements are then as follows: 1. If a key has been accepted for subsequent use, it should not be learned by the intruder, except through a compromise event. This is virtually the same as requirement 1 of the last section.
This requirement assumes that the request is for authenticating a particular key. If we need only that the request is for the authentication is for some current k ey we h a v e: 
Analysis of a Modi ed Version of the NS Protocol
In this section we describe how w e applied the set of requirements developed in this paper to use the NRL Protocol Analyzer to evaluate a version of the reauthentication protocol of Neuman and Stubblebine 8 . This lead to the discovery of an implementation-dependent a w similar to the one found in 12 and 2 , as well as of an attack that pointed out a place where our requirements might b e t o o stringent. As in the earlier case, the discovery of an implementation-dependent aw does not mean that implementations of the protocol are necessarily or even likely to be awed, but rather that there is a hidden assumption in the specication whose violation would cause a security a w. In this case, as in the aw discovered in 12 and 2 , the hidden assumption is that the principals have the ability to recognize di erent t ypes of data, such a s k eys, nonces, and timestamps.
In 12 and 2 an attack w as found on the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol which depends upon the receiver's inability to distinguish a nonce from a key. We do not present the attack here, but note that it depends upon the receiver's confusing the message it generates in the second step in the protocol with the message it receives in the fourth step. It was conjectured in 12 that this attack could be foiled by using two di erent encryption keys for the two messages. Thus each principal B would share two k eys with the server, K bs and K bb . W e attempted to verify this claim by applying the NRL Protocol Analyzer to the requirements set forth in this paper. What we found was that, although the attack on the receiver's key no longer succeeded, it was possible to mount a similar attack on the initiator's key.
We did this by specifying the modi ed Neuman-Stubblebine protocol and ran the the NRL Protocol Analyzer on the requirement that, if a key is accepted as good by the sender, then it must have been requested by the sender and subsequently generated by a k ey server.
We attempted to verify that the protocol satis ed this requirement b y showing that the negation of the requirement w as unreachable. In other words, we attempted to show that there was no path to the state in which the initiator of the protocol had accepted a key as good, but in which the sequence in which the initiator requested a key and the key server had generated the key did not occur. The Analyzer was able to generate the following path by which such a state could be reached. The attack is subtle, and makes use of the interleaving of two instances of the protocol, one initiated by A with B, and one initiated by the intruder acting as B attempting to initiate an instance of the protocol with A. In 1, A sends a message to B initiating a session with B. This is intercepted by the intruder E. I n 1 , E impersonating B attempts to initiate a session with A, this time sending N a as B's nonce. In 2 , A encrypts B's message together with a timestamp and forwards it to S. This message is also intercepted by E. In 3, E forwards the encrypted message from 2 a s i f i t w ere the server's response to B's response to A's initial message. The last two parts of the message are not used by A, s o E can substitute anything she likes. A decrypts the message and checks for the nonce. She then assumes that T a must be fK ab ; T b g . W e also ran the Protocol Analyzer on the same requirement from the point of view of a receiver B. In this case we w ere able to prove that, if B accepts a word as a key, then that word must have been generated as a key by a k ey server. In other words, B cannot be fooled into accepting a piece of a timestamp as a key. H o w ever, if the intruder E is able to nd out the timestamp, then E can use T a to impersonate B to A. Since timestamps may not be as well protected as keys, this may be possible.
The success of the attack w e found with the Protocol Analyzer relies upon a number of assumptions which m a y o r m a y not hold in the actual implementation of the protocol. The rst of these is that timestamps are of variable length. In the last step, A must be able to confuse a timestamp with a key concatenated with a timestamp. The second assumption is that the initiator of a protocol does not check a timestamp generated by the receiver. Again, this is not speci ed by Neuman and Stubblebine, but one could imagine cases in which the receiver would want t o c heck a timestamp in order to avoid replying to messages that are obviously out of date. Finally, w e m ust assume that there is no way A can distinquish between keys and timestamps. Thus, for example, there is no eld in a message to tell A whether to expect the next eld to be a timestamp or a key.
In spite of the fact that it is not likely that a particular implementation will satisfy all these assumptions, knowledge of this attack can be of help in our attempt to gain understanding of how to design a protocol for security. I t c a n tell us which assumptions we should be careful about relaxing for fear of opening up a protocol to attack, and it can tell us which features are relevant to security, and thus should be protected against subversion by a hostile intruder. Thus, for example, any t yping mechanism used in an implementation of the NeumanStubblebine protocol is relevant to the security of that protocol, and we m ust be careful to ensure that the mechanism is strong enough so that an intruder cannot cause a message of one type to be passed o as a message of another.
Our analysis of the requirements on the conditions under which the receiver will accept a key turned up another attack, although in this case the attack pointed to a place in which the requirement m a y be too stringent, rather than a a w in the protocol itself. It was found that if a compromise event occurs right after the server generates a key, the intruder can cause a receiver B to accept a key as coming from a sender A even though A never requested it: the intruder requests the key while pretending to be A, w aits for S to send the key, compromises the key, and then impersonates A to B by proving knowledge of the key in the nal step. We note, however, that although such an attack could be prevented, it is probably not worthwhile to do so. In general, protocols are designed to be secure against compromise of keys outside of a given round, not within a round. For example, there is no way to recover against an intruder's compromising a key during a session except to generate a new session key. T h us our discovery of this attack" shows us that our requirement is too stringent, and it should be modi ed to one of the following form: rec acceptuserB;honest ; userA; honest; K ; M 2: 3 -compromiseenvironment; ; K ; M ? ! 3 -sendS; userA; honest; userB;honest; K ; M ?3 -requestuserA; honest; userB;honest; ; M ? 6 
Conclusion
In this paper we h a v e shown how a requirements language based on temporal logic can be of assistance in the speci cation and veri cation of cryptographic protocols. One of the disadvantages of currently available logical languages for cryptographic protocol analysis is that for the most part each protocol has its own speci cation. Our approach goes some way t o w ards a remedy by allowing a single set of requirements to specify a whole class of protocols. This has the advantage that a protocol analyst can largely identify the goals of any protocol in this class with that one speci cation, which seems to be a fairly intuitive w a y to view things. Once the general class of protocol requirements has been identi ed, it is possible to ne-tune the requirements for the particular application. This is what we h a v e done in this paper. We rst gave a general set of requirements for key distribution protocols involving a key server. We then showed how the requirements should be augmented to handle key reauthentication. Finally, we showed how the key reauthentication requirements could be modi ed to express or leave out the requirement for binding reauthenticated keys to the initial communication, depending whether or not this was needed.
Once we h a v e developed a set of requirements, we can use them together with a formal analysis of a particular protocol both to help us to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the protocol better and to help us improve our understanding of the requirements. In our analysis of the modi ed NeumanStubblebine protocol with the NRL Protocol Analyzer, we w ere able to make progress in both of these areas. Thus we h a v e provided evidence for the usefulness of our approach.
